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Abstract

misrepresentation of self or product, or other moral
hazards benefiting one party in a transaction at the
expense of another (Tirole 1988).
Although EC buyer behavior has been investigated
(Lee 1998), less work has been done to investigate
changes in seller behavior, especially in Internet auctions.
In this research, we propose and test a model that shows
how sellers in Internet auctions behave in the absence of
identification, personal contact, and a higher uncertainty
on the part of the buyer about the product. We explore the
following research questions:
• Why and how does the increase in information
asymmetry brought about by Internet auction
transactions change seller behavior?
• How does the buyer in an Internet auction respond to
this increase in information asymmetry?
• How does information asymmetry affect prices in
online auctions, and social welfare, more generally?
We employ a software agent to gather data from
online auctions, extending prior work by Kauffman,
March, and Wood (1999). We analyze this data to show
how Internet auction sellers react to the customer when
information asymmetry increases.

Although the Internet is great for transferring
information, transactions in Internet auctions have a
greater information asymmetry than corresponding
transactions in traditional environments because current
auction market mechanisms allow the seller to remain
anonymous and to easily change identities. Buyers must
rely on the seller's description of a product and ability to
deliver the product as promised. Internet auction
environments make opportunistic behavior more
attractive to sellers because the chance of detection and
punishment is decreased. In this research, we examine
auction data to see the effect of opportunism in the online
auction environment.

Introduction
E-commerce (EC) offers a variety of new business
models, such as long-lasting auctions or 24-hour per day
automated order taking. These new models are designed
to generate and sustain revenue by taking advantage of
the unique characteristics of the World Wide Web.
Though the trade media has viewed EC as "the next big
thing," its growth has been below expectations. Most
companies have Web sites to provide information, but
only 4% of organizations currently generate revenue
using EC technology, up from 3% in 1998 (Littlewood
1999), implying low customer demand for EC services
from most customers. Many media analysts attribute the
lower-than-expected EC growth to low levels of trust
among consumers (Rankin 1999). Many observers have
written about how EC benefits the consumer because of
reduced search costs (Bakos 1997; Choudhury 1998).
However, what needs to be better recognized by the
research literature is how EC opportunism is facilitated by
an increase in information asymmetry between the online
buyer and the online seller.
Economics defines information asymmetries as
instances in which there is knowledge that one party has
and that another other party lacks in a variety of decisionmaking settings (e.g., production, investment, resource
allocation, contracting, and so on). Information
asymmetries often lead to various kinds of problems in
these settings, including inappropriate decisions and
outcomes, unfair exchanges of value, and loss of social
welfare. They also can occur in sales transactions, where
buyers and sellers are involved. The asymmetry in
information can occur with respect to knowledge about
product quality or knowledge about behavior that may
occur even after the sale. As a result, information
asymmetries can lead to transactions in which only one
side benefits. They can also lead to fraud, cheating,
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We examined two areas in the literature that offer
useful insights for modeling and understanding
information asymmetry problems in buyer-seller
interaction on the World Wide Web. The economics
literature has a stream of research that investigates
problems involving information asymmetries. This work
analyzes the effects of one-sided information in a
transaction. In addition, there are a number of recent
articles in the information systems literature that discuss
online auctions, as well as a larger body of literature on
the economics of auctions that are worthwhile in this
context. See Milgrom (1989) for an overview.
Economic Perspectives on Information
Asymmetries. Many authors have investigated how
information asymmetries can lead to a reduction of
promised product quality. Akerloff (1970) discussed how
markets with high information asymmetry such as the
used car market eliminate potential transactions because
buyers cannot believe sellers will not act
opportunistically. As a result, buyers will not pay for any
quality car above the lowest quality. Hence, high quality
sellers will not be able to sell their products for what they
are worth, and therefore will not transact. Klein and
Leffler (1981) developed an analytical model that shows
how opportunistic behavior will occur when the profit
from misleading customers is greater than the profit from

lost sales due to reputation effects. Shapiro (1982)
discussed how, when sellers control a market (as with a
monopoly), product quality is reduced if buyers cannot be
fully and accurately evaluated before the purchase. In
related work, Shapiro (1983) extended Klein and Leffler's
model and relaxed their assumption of perfect
communication between customers. We apply Shapiro's
model as a theoretical basis for the ideas presented in this
paper.
IS Perspectives on Online Auctions. Although the
current body of online auction literature has ignored seller
behavior in online auctions, there have been many recent
studies examining item characteristics and bidder
behavior in Internet auctions. Bapna, Goes and Gupta
(2000a) discuss how bid increment can affect revenue
generated in a multi-item auction. They also discuss lot
size, opening bid amount, the magnitude of closing bids
and the specified bid increment all affect the revenue
generated by an Internet multi-item auction. A related
paper (Bapna, Goes and Gupta, 2000b) uses online
auction data to explore and refute some common
assumptions about online auction behavior found in the
economics literature (e.g., Milgrom, 1989). Both of these
papers delve into types of bidders found on multi-item
auctions. We extend their results in this research by
comparing seller behavior to bidder behavior, and by
investigating bidder response to seller behavior.
Seidmann and Vakrat (1999) compared online
catalog prices with online auction prices. They obtained
data from 473 online auctions, such as SurplusAuction
(www.surplusauction.com) and OnSale.Com
(www.onsale.com). They compared prices received in
these auctions with prices from Internet catalog sellers,
such as Egghead (www.egghead.com) and
PriceScan.Com (www.pricescan.com). Their data analysis
revealed that consumers expect greater discounts for more
expensive items. A second study by Vakrat and Seidmann
(2000) analyzed bidder arrivals in 324 online auctions and
found that about 70% of bidders arrive during the first
half of the auction and that high required starting bids
tends to result in fewer bidders. In their studies, Seidmann
and Vakrat employed Internet agents as a data collection
tool. Although they compared online catalog prices to
Internet auction prices, we will be comparing online
auction prices to traditional, "real-world" shops. We
extend their work to investigate why researchers can
expect information asymmetries to cause a difference in
prices between traditional and online sources. Also,
although Vakrat and Seidmann concentrated on timing of
bidder entry into an auction, we concentrate on timing of
bidder exit from an auction.

quality goods in markets where the buyer cannot inspect a
good before buying. Shapiro's model shows that there is a
price premium for acting reputably. Moreover, buyers
will penalize opportunistic players, and no longer pay a
premium for their products.
Although Shapiro concentrated only on a seller's
misrepresentation of quality, we generalize his model to
describe any opportunistic behavior. Shapiro made two
simplifying assumptions. First, he assumed perfect
competition where sellers can only sell for marginal cost.
We relax that assumption to allow all sellers to profit,
thereby showing the motivation for the sale for both
opportunistic and non-opportunistic sellers. Second,
sellers were easily identified and distinguishable from
each other. By this assumption, he assumed that sellers
would be punished for acting opportunistically by
experiencing reduced demand and lower profits.
We assume that products are sold at price PR by
perceived reputable sellers (R), resulting in a quantity
sold of QR . Goods sold by non-reputable sellers (N) are
sold at price PN with quantity QN. We assume that the
non-reputable sellers are new sellers who are untested,
and thus do not have a reputation yet. They also may be
inclined to profit from opportunistic behavior. Rational
buyers demand fewer goods from non-reputable sellers
and will penalize their lack of reputation by paying less
(PN) until their reputation can be established. A reputable
seller can demand a higher price for his products since
buyers rely on his reputation. The economics literature
shows that rational sellers will act opportunistically unless
buyers not only pay more by absorbing the higher cost of
production, but also reward non-reputable sellers with a
price premium for acting non-opportunistically (Klein and
Leffler 1981; Shapiro, 1983).
Figure 1, based on the model presented by Shapiro
(1983), shows how the price charged by an opportunistic
seller in a purely competitive environment, PR , is the price
that leads to normal profits plus the price premium that
consumers are willing to pay that acts as an incentive to
sellers to avoid opportunism. UG is the utility of not
selling. For some sellers in an Internet auction, UG will
be the cost of production.1 For others, such as collectors
on eBay, UG will be the utility the seller receives from
keeping the product, if he is unable to sell at or above his
reserve price. Once utility of selling the item (e.g., the
revenue from the sale, US ) exceeds UG , the seller will sell
the item. Reputable sellers gain additional utility, UR , in
the form of a price premium for acting reputably. The
utility that opportunistic sellers (O) receive, UO , is from
the profit from the sale as well as the opportunistic action,
but if detected, the seller would forego future sales.
By changing behavior and acting opportunistically,
an opportunistic seller will increase profit because the

Modeling Opportunistic Behavior Among
Sellers in Internet Auctions
Our proposed model is based on a model by Shapiro
(1983). He defined, in general terms, how price premia
from good reputations cause sellers to avoid selling low-

1

This is not an unreasonable assumption, because some crafts
and collectibles are made for direct sale via the Internet in
auctions such as eBay's, when seller-producers don't have the
capability to sell in another channel.
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Figure 1 -- Profit Based on Reputation

probability of detection and punishment, the greater the
likelihood of an opportunistic seller emerging in the
market. Therefore, not only does there need to be a
reasonable profit for not acting opportunistically, but
there also needs to be a reasonable chance of punishment
if a seller starts acting opportunistically. This is shown in
the conceptual framework in Figure 2. As the chance of
detection and punishment approaches zero, buyers will
assume that opportunistic behavior will occur no matter
what, and will force prices down across the entire market
as a result (Akerloff 1970). More generally, we believe
that increases in information asymmetry in a variety of
buyer-seller interaction settings on the Internet (even with
straightforward marketing and selling websites, for
example) can make opportunistic behavior more attractive
to online sellers. Their chances of being punished are
slight, since anonymity is so easy to obtain on the
Internet.

UO = U S + Price Premium
+ Opportunistic Profit

P

UR = U S + Price Premium

US

PR
UG
Profit from sellers
with reputation

PN
Profit from sellers who
act opportunistically

Q

Profit from sellers
with no reputation

QN

QR

seller not only profits from opportunistic behavior but
also receives a price premium for being perceived as a
reputable seller. In the first period, buyers will not know
that the opportunistic seller acted opportunistically and
would still be willing to pay more for products from this
seller. Equation 1 shows that the Period 1 profits for
acting opportunistically is a product of the number of
units sold and the difference between revenue gained by
the opportunistic action and the price premium of a
reputable seller.
Single-Period Profit for Opportunistic Seller:
QR

π1 =

∫ (U

O

− U R )dq

Figure 2 -- Incentives for Opportunistic Behavior
Profit from
Opportunistic
Behavior
+
Opportunistic
Behavior

(1)

-

QN

Assuming perfect detection and perfect customer-tocustomer communication, in periods that follow Period 1,
the opportunistic seller will achieve lower sales;
consumers will now consider the seller to be
opportunistic, and will avoid buying from that seller.
Shapiro (1983) went further to describe situations where
the opportunism would not be detected. For instance, in a
new car, safety features (such as air bag equipment) can
be left off, and the consumer might never find out. He
introduced a variable, λ, to indicate the probability of
detection of opportunistic behavior. For the purposes of
our model, we expand Shapiro's definition by defining λ
as the probability of being detected and punished for
opportunistic behavior. Opportunistic sellers do not
consider whether they will be detected, but rather they
concentrate on the probability of future losses because of
their current behavior. Future losses can be expressed as
1-λ adjusted by the annuity discount rate, r, multiplied by
future profits for non-opportunistic behavior, as shown in
Equation 2.
Future Lost Profit for Current Opportunistic Seller:

1− λ
πf =
∫ (U R − U G )dq
r QN

Probability of
Detection and
Punishment of
Opportunism

Expected Profits from
Premiums for
Non-Opportunistic
Future Transactions

Analysis
Testing seller opportunism is difficult for three
reasons. First, non-reputable sellers try to remain
anonymous. Because they are attempting to hide their
identity, it is difficult to identify them. Second, it is
difficult to track multiple Internet auction identities and
tie them together. Third, opportunistic behavior often
needs to be viewed in total rather than in isolation. For
instance, if a seller leaves himself a good comment or
bids on his own item to run the price up, such behavior
needs to be viewed in context of other behavior before the
opportunistic seller can be identified.
Based on the proposed model, we expect sellers in
Internet auctions to be likely to be opportunistic. From
anecdotal evidence in discussions with eBay buyers, we
know that sellers can easily set up multiple identities and
sell through the same channel. Sellers are also
anonymous. Finally, sellers can easily perform
opportunistic behavior that is difficult to detect. Sellers
either establish new handles or work in collusion with
certain buyers to bid on their own items and also may
leave themselves good reputation scores. As a result of
the reduction in the chances of detection, the Internet
auction seller's benefit from opportunistic behavior may

QR

(2)

When πf ≥ π1 , the reputable seller will not act
opportunistically. This is because it will not be in his best
interest to do so. Only if πf < π1 will the seller act
opportunistically. In Equation 2, the lower the
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be greater than the chance of loss of profit from future
transactions since changing a handle can mask a seller's
identity and eliminate reputation effects.
Rational buyers in Internet auctions recognize that
sellers have several avenues of opportunistic behavior
open to them. As a result, we hypothesize that rational
bidders pay little, if any, attention to a seller reputation
score reported by the auction because of possible
opportunistic action by the seller to leave themselves
good comments. In addition, online auctions should
command lower prices than identical items sold in
traditional markets where the information asymmetry is
less prominent. This is because, as Akerloff (1970)
suggests, the high chance of opportunism decreases the
amount sellers can charge. Buyers will expect some level
of opportunism because of the increase in information
asymmetry and will adjust their prices downward.
Data and Hypotheses. Using the methodologies
described by Kauffman, March, and Wood (1999), we
developed a data-collecting Internet agent to gather data
from an online auction. With the information gathered by
this agent, we explored bid timing and amounts, and
gauged the effects of an auction and item characteristics
on what a bidder is willing to bid. The exhaustive nature
of this data collection would have been impossible using
traditional data-collection methodologies.
Our focus in this study is the rare coin collection
market on eBay. We classified coins using an artificial
intellegence algorithm that we developed for this purpose.
The algorithm uses a classification scheme that consists of
identifying the coin year (e.g., 1888, etc.), the coin
denomination (e.g., penny, 2-cent piece, etc.), the coin
type (e.g., Philadelphia mint, double die, feather between
the "C" and the "A", etc.), and the condition, or coin
grade (e.g., very good, extremely fine, etc.). Coin grade is
communicated using a special language known to coin
collectors. It allows coin collectors to communicate the
grade of a coin. For example, collectors know the
difference between fine and very fine, and that fine+ and
fine/very fine and f15 are the same grade for a coin. Only
rare coins from the 1800s were considered, to eliminate
the likelihood that "flea market" buyers and sellers would
be considered. Coin types and book values for these coins
were obtained from Coin World (Gibbs 1999), the
"industry bible" for coin collectors. These book values are
typically what is charged by coin dealers at coin stores,
like the Blue Book of used car prices, and represent
pricing in the traditional market for coin collectors. We
collected 38,714 bids from 6,798 different bidders on
14,528 items from eBay during May 1999 and February
2000. Any bid that came in later than a previous bid but
was for a lesser amount was not placed in the data set.
We define questionable bidder behavior (QBB) as
bidding on an item when the same or a lower bid could
have been made on the exact same item in a concurrent
auction ending before the bid-upon auction. We consider
QBB to be irrational, since the buyer has a greater level of

utility if she were to bid on another item for the same or
lower cost. We feel it is reasonable to assume that eBay
sellers have identical reputations, since they are typically
small dealers who do not have much brand equity. Bakos
(1997) showed that, for commodity items, rational buyers
will buy the lowest priced item when the search price is
low. There are three possible explanations for QBB. First,
bidders are only boundedly rational and do not search the
auction for similar items before bidding. We reject this
logic for two reasons: (a) auctions that end early appear
towards the top in the eBay screen display and therefore
should be found first, and (b) most auctions allow easy
searching for items. Second, bidders are irrational and
bid on an item that is listed that gives other bidders
greater time to bid against their bid. While irrational
behavior may be exhibited by some bidders some of the
time, we reject the idea that bidders in aggregate will bid
on an item when the same or lower bid can be offered on
an item whose sale is ending sooner. Third, bidders have a
vested interest in making sure a high price is received for
a particular item, either because of collusion with the
seller or because the buyer handle is used by the seller as
a second identity to run up the bid. We believe that this is
the case. We found QBB in 987 bids in 713 auctions.
We next investigate three hypotheses using our data:
Low Revenue Hypothesis: Online coin auctions
will generate significantly lower prices than Coin
World's book value, which is used to sell coins in
traditional coin shops. Akerloff (1970) and Leland
(1979) showed that, when faced with an asymmetric
information situation, buyers will be forced to assume that
the value of what they are buying is not worth what the
seller is stating. This is because the seller may act
opportunistically and mislead the buyer about the
condition of the good. Although Akerloff concentrated
on the used car market, the same dynamics should also
apply to online auctions where the buyer cannot inspect
the good before the transaction. We hypothesize that
goods purchased in an EC environment must sell for less
than corresponding goods sold from a traditional store.
Of the 10,000 coins listed, 8,011were sold to bidders and
had an entry in Coin World (Gibbs 1999). Our findings
support the hypothesis with a high level of significance.
Coins transacted in online auctions sold at only 47% of
the price suggested by Coin World. These results confirm
Akerloff's (1970) and Leland's (1979) research: buyers
expect to pay less for coins sold in online auctions
because of the increased risk of opportunism.
Effective Comments Hypothesis: eBay's reputation
score will have an insignificant impact on seller price
and bids, and negative comments will have a significant,
negative effect on seller price. Akerloff (1970) describes
how buyers, when faced with asymmetric information,
will act rationally and will assume that sellers will take
advantage of the information asymmetry to act
opportunistically. Based on conversations that we had
with eBay bidders and our personal experiences, we
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learned that some sellers may offer a discount after the
auction if the buyer leaves a good comment.
Additionally, we found that some sellers can leave
themselves good comments using another handle or work
in conjunction with other sellers to leave each other good
comments. Hence, we believe that rational bidders will
realize the ineffectiveness of comments and ignore the
eBay reputation score when making buying decisions.
Conversely, since buyers can leave bad comments for
sellers but sellers would have no incentive to leave
themselves bad comments, we hypothesized that negative
comments will have a significant, negative effect on price.
For this test, we conducted a within-subjects quasiexperiment. Since collectibles can change in value over
time, we first separated bids collected in March 1999
from bids collected in February 2000. We then identified
buyers who bid multiple times on the same item (same
year, denomination, type, grade) from different sellers
during the same time period, and calculated the average
price for each bidder. We identified 774 distinct
bidders/item combinations. From these, we identified
1,822 final bids from bidders for items and calculated the
percentage difference between the final bid for each
specific item and seller and the average for that item
among all sellers. We then compared the percentage to
eBay's reported reputation overall score and to the
number of negative comments left by other bidders. Our
analysis showed an extremely slight correlation (ρ =4%)
between reputation score and price that was only
modestly significant (p-value=.076). We expected a
significant negative relationship between the number of
negative comments and price. Instead, we found a
positive (ρ =1.1%) but insignificant (p-value = .63)
correlation between negative comments and price. When
the percentage of negative comments to overall comments
is considered instead of the raw negative score, we see the
predictive negative effect (ρ =-3.0%), but not at a
significant level (p-value = .20). Finally, the relationship
between number of bids and the reputation is significantly
negative (ρ =-0.1 with a p-value extremely close to zero).
We explain these results by noting that higher
overall reputation scores and many negative comments
indicate a seller who has sold much on eBay and is
somewhat established. Therefore, buyers may feel safer
with more established players than with the fly-by-night
sellers who do not stand to gain much from a good
reputation. Non-established bidders tend to set starting
bids that are too low, and therefore invite a larger number
of bidders. In other words, eBay’s reputation score can be
a proxy for seller experience rather than the actual
reputation of the seller.
Run Up the Bid Hypothesis: Bidders that exhibit
QBB will bid on items from fewer sellers, have a lesser
probability of winning an auction than average, tend to
complete bidding earlier in an auction compared to
other bidders, and, bid in higher increments than
average increments between bids. Detecting multiple

handles in online auctions is especially difficult. Sellers
who run up the bid will try to remain anonymous, and the
online auction environment facilitates their anonymity.
Since it is unlikely to find bidders who will divulge their
opportunistic actions, instead we investigated recorded
behavior that is intrinsic to running up the bid. Specifically, those who run up the bid:
(a) are agents of the seller, and therefore not necessarily
buyers and will tend to limit their bids to a single
seller or perhaps a few seller Ids;
(b) do not want to win the auction, but rather want the
winner to pay more;
(c) want to avoid bidding near the end of the auction
where the chance of winning is greater; and,
(d) bid in increments higher than average in an effort to
quickly run up the bid.
Table 1. Results of Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis
tstatistic

N
(Group1/
Group 2)

Low Revenue:
Auction Price for Coins
13.2***
8,011 /
Will Be Less Than Coin
8,011
Store Price
Effective Comments:
(a) Overall Score Will
1.8*
1,822 /
Be Significant on
1,822
Final Price
(b) Negative Comments
0.5
1,822 /
Will Be Negative
1,822
and Significant on
Final Price
(c) Percentage Ratio of
-1.3
1820
Negative Comments
to Overall Score
Will Be Negative
and Significant on
Final Price
(d) Overall Score Will
-11.2***
14,156
Be Significant and
Positive on the
Number of bids
Run Up the Bid: QBs who we hypothesize are in
actuality running up the bid have:
(a) Fewer Sellers
3.8***
643 /
6,155
(b) Fewer Winners
7.5***
1,260 /
26,425
(c) More Early Bidders
39.3***
1,260 /
26,425
(d) Higher Bid
3.9***
588 /
Increments
18,648
Legend: * = significant at the 10% level;
*** = significant at the 1% level
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We examine these by studying the behavior of those
bidders who exhibited QBB. We then compare their
behavior to other bidders' behavior to see if there is
evidence of collusion or multiple seller handles used to
run up the bid.We identified 643 bidders from the 6,798
different bidders that have shown QBB. To test the
number of sellers, we derived a ratio between the number
bids and the number of sellers. A non-parametric twotailed t-test was used to test the ratios to see if there was a
difference. "Questionable bidders" (QBs) had more bids
per seller than other bidders (µ=1.45 vs. µ=1.25),
indicating that QBs are concentrating on specific sellers.
Our analysis shows that QBs only win 26% of the time,
compared to bids from other bidders who win 35% of the
time. QBs also tend to drop out sooner than other
bidders. They drop out an average of 5.1 days before the
auction ends, compared with 1.8 days before the auction
ends for other bidders. Finally, QBs tend to bid 200%
above the previous bid, if there is one. Other bidders, on
the other hand, only bid 65% above the previous bid.
These tests show that results consistent with "running up
the bid" behavior exist in online auctions, and that sellers
are running up the bid to try to falsely signal more interest
in an item or to get the current bidders to bid higher
amounts.

that automatic bidders will bid on fewer sellers or
generate fewer winners.
Another possible limitation of this analysis is the
documented existence of evaluators by Bapna, Goes, and
Gupta (2000a; 2000b). They showed how evaluators in
multi-item auctions bid early at an amount higher than the
bid increment. We reject that QBs are evaluators because
of three reasons. First, the authors indicated that
evaluators would be rare in traditional auctions like eBay.
Second, the authors also never indicated that QBs could
have bid on other items in auctions that ended earlier.
Third, evaluators in their work usually won their auctions
compared with QBs who typically lost their auctions,
indicating a difference in motivation between evaluators
and QBs.
Researchers will be able to build on the exploratory
results that we report here. The framework presented in
this paper is based on a relatively simple model that needs
to be expanded to show why an equilibrium price
premium for reputable sellers should exist that will deter
opportunistic behavior. Additionally, researchers need to
further delve into seller behavior both inside auctions and
in EC in general to generate a more complete picture of
seller strategies and behavior.
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